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Who is On the Outside Looking In,
and What Do They See?:
Metaphors of Exclusion in Legal
Education'
by David T. Ritchie*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Many people might assume that metaphors are linguistic devices that
pithily play on associations between unrelated kinds of things.' These
associations, many might further assume, show how deft an author can
be at using a turn of phrase or how agile a speaker might be using

t This Article comes out of the Mercer Law Review Symposium, "Using Metaphor in
Legal Analysis and Communication," held on November 10, 2006, in Macon, Georgia. I
would like to thank the participants of that Symposium, Linda Berger, Michael Goldberg,
Mark Johnson, Michael Smith, and Steven Winter for an enlightening and enjoyable
program. I also want to thank Professor Harold Lewis, faculty advisor to the Law Review,
and the Mercer Law Review for selecting and supporting this project. Thanks finally to
Dean Daisy Hurst Floyd for supporting this program, and to Professor Linda H. Edwards
for her advice and support on so many things.
* Associate Professor of Law, Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law.
Cleveland State University (B.A., 1991); Howard University School of Law (J.D., 1995);
Beasley School of Law, Temple University (LL.M., 2001); University of Oregon (Ph.D.,
2004). Member, State Bar of Oregon. © David T. Ritchie, 2007. This, and all my research,
is generously supported by the Dean and Faculty at the Mercer University School of Law.
I would like to thank Linda Edwards, Suzianne Painter-Thorne, Jack Sammons, Jennifer
Sheppard, and Karen Sneddon for their willingness to read a draft of this Article and
provide me with invaluable feedback. Any remaining inaccuracies or omissions are mine
alone. Finally, I would also like to thank Elizabeth Dees for her patience, and Andy Cohen
for his research assistance.
1. Thomas Hobbes was of this view, maintaining that metaphors are language
ornaments. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN Pt. I, Ch. 4 (John Plamenatz ed., Prometheus
Books 1962) (1651).
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widely known imagery to illustrate a point.2 Such assumptions are not
completely arbitrary, as metaphors do indeed have important literary
aspects. This device, though, is often presumed to be a mere literary or
rhetorical trope8 designed to enliven one's language or show intellectual
dexterity in discourse.4 Metaphor is, in this view, a mere trick designed
to conceal or cover over the truth by making a superficial comparison
with unrelated phenomena.5
In fact, there are well known theorists and jurists in Anglo-American
jurisprudence who have expressed skeptical views about the power of
metaphor in legal discourse.6 England's Lord Mansfield cautioned that
"nothing in law is so apt to mislead [as] a metaphor,"7 and the British
philosopher Jeremy Bentham suggested that metaphor was the
antithesis of legal reasoning.' This cynicism was picked up on this side
of the Atlantic by the nineteenth century Yale law professor Wesley
Hohfeld,9 and later by Benjamin Cardozo who suggested that metaphors
in legal analysis and communication had "to be narrowly watched, for
starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving
it." ° Other prominent jurists, such as former U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Felix Frankfurter," agreed. More recently, the constitutional
theorist Robert Tsai has said that "[1legal scholars have traditionally
understood metaphor as, at worst, a perversion of the law, and at best,
as a necessary but temporary place-holder for more fully developed lines
of argument." 2
What if these skeptical views about the role of metaphor in human
reasoning and communication are misplaced, however? If, as some have

2. David S. Miall, Metaphor and Literary Meaning, 17 BRrr. J. AEsTHETIcs 49 (1977).
3. Metaphor, http'//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphor (last visited Apr. 23, 2007).
4. Using Metaphors in Creative Writing, http//owl.english.purdue.edu/handouts/
general/glmetaphor.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2007).
5. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LrvE BY 245 (1980).
6. See Eduardo Moisds Pefialver, Property Metaphors and Kelo v. New London: Two
Views of the Castle, available at http'J/ssrn.com/abstract=881100 (last visited Apr. 23,
2007); Bernard J. Hibbitts, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the
Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 229, 235 (1994).
7. Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1057 n.9 (1989);
Hibbitts, supra note 6, at 235.
8. Robert L. Tsai, Fire,Metaphor, and ConstitutionalMyth-Making, 93 GEO. L.J. 181,
186 (2004); Pefialver, supra note 6, at 1.
9. See Hibbitts, supra note 6, at 235.
10. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926); Hibbitts, supra note 6,
at 235.

11. Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 69 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); see Hibbitts, supra note 6, at 235 n.37.
12. Tsai, supra note 8, at 186.
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persuasively argued, 8 human cognition is profoundly metaphorical in
nature, 4 would not the evaluation and discussion of the role of
metaphor in all areas of human enterprise take on a more important role
in understanding how we as a species do the things we do?' 5 In fact,
this is the emerging consensus. 16 The academic literature in almost
every area of human concern 7 has embraced the importance of
metaphor, not as linguistic chicanery but as a fundamental aspect of
human reasoning about those areas of concern."8
Certainly, within the realm of legal scholarship, the status of
metaphor has risen considerably.' 9 Dozens and dozens of articles have
appeared in the last couple of decades2 ° that acknowledge the importance of metaphor both in legal analysis and reasoning, and in the way
lawyers, judges, and scholars communicate about the law. Virtually all
of these contributions endorse the notion that metaphors in legal

13. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5.
14. Lakoff and Johnson argue that we "live by" certain sorts of metaphors. See
generally LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5.
15. See Jacques Derrida, White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy, in
MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 207 (Alan Bass trans., 1982).
16. It should be noted that this perspective, however, is not new. Aristotle, for
instance, seemed to reserve a central role for metaphor in his philosophy of mind. See, e.g.,
Aristotle, Poetics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE: THE REVISED OXFORD
TRANSLATION 2316 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984). More recently, the French philosopher
Jacques Derrida traced the important role metaphor has played in the philosophical
systems of George W.F. Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Marx, and Martin Heidegger.
Derrida, supra note 15, at 208-19.
17. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 267-72; see, e.g., EVE E. SWEETSER, FROM
ETYMOLOGY TO PRAGMATICS: METAPHORICAL AND CULTURAL ASPECTS OF SEMANTIC
STRUCTURE (1990); GILLES FAUCONNIER, MENTAL SPACES: ASPECTS OF MEANING
CONSTRUCTION IN NATURAL LANGUAGE (1985); RAYMOND W. GIBBS, THE POETICS OF MIND:
FIGURATIVE THOUGHT, LANGUAGE, AND UNDERSTANDING (1994); RONALD W. LANGACKER,
CONCEPT, IMAGE, AND SYMBOL: THE COGNITIVE BASIS OF GRAMMAR (1990); ZOLTAN
KbVECSES, METAPHOR AND EMOTION: LANGUAGE, CULTURE, AND BODY IN HUMAN FEELING
(2000).
18. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 267-72.
19. STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001)
[hereinafter WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST]; see also Steven L. Winter, What is the
'Color of Law?," in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF METAPHOR AND THOUGHT (Ray Gibbs ed.,
2005); Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of "Under Color of" Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323
(1992); Steven L. Winter, Death is the Mother of Metaphor, 105 HARV. L. REV. 745 (1992);
Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agony Between Legal Power and
Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental
Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1105 (1989); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of SelfGovernance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988).
20. For representative samples, see supra notes 6, 7, 8 & 19 and infra notes 26 & 27.
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discourse are fundamental to the way we understand and use legal
concepts. These endorsements have led to innovative and important
discussions about the nature of legal analysis and communication in our
tradition of jurisprudence. 2 Following on the ground-breaking work of
the philosopher and cognitive theorist Mark Johnson,22 Steven Winter
has suggested that "a cognitive understanding of metaphor provides a
more genuinely pragmatic alternative to the insistence on dichotomous
thinking that so dominates and distorts contemporary legal thought."23
Leading voices in legal communication 24 have taken up this mantle,25
evaluating how the metaphors used in business and corporate law
26
indelibly shape the way we think about how business is carried out.

Some have even developed theories about how to construct and employ
metaphors 27 in the. context of the American adversary system. 28 In
short, contrary to what Bentham and Cardozo thought, metaphor has
come to be seen as a fundamental and liberating way of forming and
expressing our intellectual imagination in the context of legal reasoning
and communication.

21. One such conversation recently took place at the Walter F. George School of Law
at Mercer University in Macon, Georgia, where a symposium brought together experts in
cognitive science, legal communication, legal theory, philosophy, and religion. See
Symposium: Using Metaphor in Legal Analysis and Communication, 58 MERCER L. REV.
(Spring 2007).
22. Mark Johnson & Diego Fernandez-Duque, Cause and Effect Theories of Attention:
The Role of Conceptual Metaphors, 6 GEN. REV. PSYCHOL. 153 (2002); Mark Johnson &
Diego Fernandez-Duque, Attention Metaphors: How Metaphors Guide the Cognitive
Psychology of Attention, 23 COGNITIVE Sci. 83 (1999); Mark Johnson, Introduction: Why
Metaphor Matters to Philosophy, 10 METAPHOR & SYMBOLIC ACT=VIT 157 (1995); Mark
Johnson, ConceptualMetaphorand Embodied StructuresofMeaning, 6 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 413
(1993); Mark Johnson, Embodied Knowledge, 19 CuRRIcULuM INQUIRY 361 (1989); George
Lakoff & Mark Johnson, The Metaphorical Logic of Rape, 2 METAPHOR & SYMBOLIC
ACTIVITY 73 (1987).
23. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST, supra note 19, at 43.
24. The careful and informed reader might note that I have purposefully abandoned the
traditional use of the label "legal writing," opting instead to use the phrase "legal
communication." Legal communication comes closer to capturing the more expansive
analytical and cognitive elements that are entailed in legal discourse.
25. Certamente, este 6 um metaphor! C'est une mtaphore! Certainly, this is a
metaphor!
26. Linda L. Berger, What is the Sound of the CorporationSpeaking? How the Cognitive
Theory of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ASSN LEGAL WRITING
DIRECTORS 169 (2004).
27. MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND STRATEGIES IN
PERSUASWVE WRITING (2002).
28. Clearly, this is not limited to application in the context of U.S. legal theory and
practice.
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First, I will briefly

discuss29 the way in which metaphor has a formative and ontological
effect on how we see and live in the world. Here, I will draw upon the
work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, touching upon the notion that
we "live by" ° certain metaphors. In Part II of this Article, I will
discuss the basic theory behind cognitive or conceptual metaphor. While
not an exhaustive treatment, this discussion should orient the reader to
the fundamental aspects of this theory. Then I will develop one
particular category of metaphors that Lakoff and Johnson have
identified, s ' which has subsequently been picked up by others in
discussions of contemporary political theory (especially in the European
context). 2 This class of metaphors relates to the theme of exclusion. 3
My decision to discuss this particular class of metaphors is not
happenstance. These are metaphors that are frequently used in the
legal academy to discuss the status of people who teach legal skillsrelated courses.3 4
This leads me to my second task. The remainder of the Article (Part
III) will be devoted to evaluating and discussing some of these metaphors of exclusion with an eye to the ontological effect they have upon
36
3
those who teach legal skills courses (particularly "legal writing").
I must caution that this discussion is not simply another in a long line
of calls for the increased status of legal writing and legal skills
professors (although it might be that at some level as well), but is
instead a look at how those of us in these positions sometimes unwittingly contribute to the reinscription of exclusionary metaphors and

29. I will not belabor the reader by duplicating efforts that are more fully exhausted
elsewhere, including those offered in the present volume of work.
30. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 3-5.
31. Id. at 29-32.
32. See, e.g, Robin Peace, Social Exclusion: A Concept in Need of Definition?, 16 SOC.
POLVY J. NEW ZEALAND 17 (2001).
33. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 29-32.
34. See, e.g., Kristen Konrad Robbins, Philosophy v. Rhetoric in Legal Education:
Understandingthe Schism Between Doctrinaland Legal Writing Faculty, 3 J. Ass'N LEGAL
WRITING DIRECTORS 108 (2006).
35. I understand the inherent weakness of maintaining the dichotomy of "doctrine" vs.
"skills." As I will explain later on, I prefer to abandon the dichotomy altogether.
Nonetheless, in this preliminary discussion I have chosen to maintain the terminology
currently used to minimize confusion.
36. See, e.g., Jan M. Levine, Legal Research and Writing: What Schools are Doing, and
Who is Doing the Teaching, 7 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 51 (1998-2000); Jan M. Levine &
Cheryl Beckett, Status and Salary, in THE POLITICS OF LEGAL WRITING: PROCEEDINGS OF
A CONFERENCE FOR LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING PROGRAM DIRECTORS (Jan M. Levine,
Rebecca Cochran & Steve Johansen eds., 1996).
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ultimately to the re-entrenchment of the hierarchy itself. In my view,
this reinscription, in turn, makes it impossible to change the dynamic of
power and status that reigns in the contemporary legal academy.8 7 If
I am correct, we (those of us who teach legal skills) have as much
responsibility as anyone for the current state of affairs. Who we are and
how we are perceived can be changed. By recognizing that status is-in
a very true way-a metaphorical relationship, we perhaps have more
power to change our own situations than we might dare to imagine.
II.

THE POWER OF METAPHORS OF EXCLUSION

The linguist George Lakoff and the philosopher Mark Johnson have,
over the past twenty-five years, developed a robust theory of how
metaphor works in the way humans analyze and make sense of the
world.38 Their work in this regard has been widely cited in fields as
diverse as clinical psychology, cognitive science, law, linguistics, literary
studies, philosophy, and politics.39 Below, I will briefly discuss some of
the salient features of the cognitive theory of metaphor, laying out its
basic structure. This discussion is necessary, I believe, so that the
reader can see why the last part of this Article contains some troubling
implications. After setting out the basic features of the cognitive theory
of metaphor, I turn to examining one particular set of metaphors that
illustrate how this theory is used in constructing an understanding of a
complex moral and political problem and analyzing that understanding.
This category of metaphors relates to notions of exclusion. I am
convinced that current debates surrounding the status of some members
of law faculties in the United States can be amply explained by drawing
on this theory of metaphor. As such, the following examination of
Lakoff's and Johnson's work could have a far-reaching impact on an
important and raging debate within the legal academy.
A.

The Cognitive or Conceptual Theory of Metaphor

Advocates of the cognitive theory of metaphor maintain that metaphors are fundamental to the way we understand and experience the
world.' George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, for example, have said that
"our ordinary conceptual system is metaphorical in nature."4'
In
essence, the way we think is dependent on metaphor.42 This theory has

37. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 36; Levine & Beckett, supra note 36.
38. See supra note 22.
39. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 243.
40. Id. at 4-5.
41. Id. at 4.
42. Id. at 6.
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profound implications." If this idea is correct, and it has gained wide
currency," then human cognition is determined in no small part by the
ability to recognize, understand, and use metaphors. 5 This, in turn,
suggests that who we are is determined by metaphors.4 6 In effect, we
"live by" metaphors in the truest sense.47 Far from being a mere
linguistic device, according to this view metaphorical reasoning is a
metaphysical principle of the highest order.48
Metaphors are ways of describing or illustrating one concept by
equating it to something else.49 The relationship between the first
concept ("target" in Lakoff's scheme) and the second concept ("source")
is one of ascription.5" In ascribing the characteristics of the source
concept upon the target concept, we are conveying meaning about the
target concept by playing on one's conceptual understanding of the
attributes of the source concept."' It is this relationship that conveys
meaning, not the words that are used. 2 In effect, when we are faced
with understanding a concept that is new or difficult, we cognitively seek
to relate the unknown idea to something we do know in order to make
the new or difficult concept more intelligible."
Very often, perhaps
almost always, this ascriptive relationship is created without consciously
thinking about it."
Some, like Lakoff and Johnson,5 suggest that this metaphoric aspect
of reasoning is cognitive in nature. 56 That is to say, advocates of the
cognitive theory of metaphor maintain that metaphors are deeply
ingrained in the way our brains work. 7 According to Lakoff and

43. See, e.g., GILLES FAUCONNIER & MARK TURNER, THE WAY WE THINK: CONCEPTUAL
BLENDING AND THE MIND'S HIDDEN CoMPLEXITIS (2002); SARA F. TAUB, LANGUAGE FROM
THE BODY: ICONICITY AND METAPHOR IN AMERICAN SIGN LANGUAGE (2001); MARK TURNER,
DEATH IS THE MOTHER OF BEAUTY: MIND, METAPHOR, CRITICISM (1987); Lera Boroditsky,
Metaphoric Structuring:UnderstandingTime Through Spatial Metaphors, 75 COGNITION
1 (2000).
44. See, e.g., supra note 43.
45. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 3-9.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Derrida, supra note 15, at 212.
49. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 3.
50. GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES
REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 276-78 (1987).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 11.
55. Id. at ch. 1.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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Johnson and those who follow their views, metaphors make so much
sense to us because we are-at base-creatures who understand concepts
in metaphorical terms.5 As Lakoff and Johnson put it, "we systematically use inference patterns from one conceptual domain to reason about
another conceptual domain. " " Cognitive-or conceptual-metaphor
theory is a systematic aspect of our analytical abilities.6 0 Lakoff and
Johnson suggest that our pervasive use of metaphor in analyzing and
describing phenomena flows from the fact that our bodies interface with
the world in certain ways.6" This has been taken so far as to mean
that our brains are wired in ways that recognize and utilize metaphorical relationships.6 2 These relationships are, in this view, neurological
in nature.63
Others, like the philosopher Donald Davidson, have rejected this
notion as being wrong-headed." According to Davidson, metaphors can
only be propositional in nature.6" As such, metaphors are merely
contingent linguistic constructs that hold no independent truth-value.66
This concept is a return to the widely held notion that metaphors are not
fundamental to human reasoning but are instead simply a contingent
matter of the language we choose to use in explaining things.6" This
view has been discussed at length by, among others, Steven Winter,
who suggests that Davidson's views are not borne out by the evidence in
cognitive theory.6 9 According to Winter, and ultimately to Lakoff and
Johnson, "Thought is not primarily linguistic and propositional, but
embodied and imaginative ... ."'o As Lakoff and Johnson themselves
put it, "[M]etaphor is a natural phenomenon. Conceptual metaphor is

58.
59.
60.
61.
(1999).
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id. at 246.
Id. at 7-9.
Id. at 246; GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH 81-93
LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 257-59.
Id.
DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 263-64 (1994).

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. This view is what Lakoff and Johnson refer to as "the single biggest obstacle" to
understanding a cognitive or conceptual theory of metaphor. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra
note 5, at 245.
68. Steven Winter has a very intriguing and persuasive discussion of this debate in
Chapter 3 of his book A CLEARING IN THE FOREST. See supra note 19.
69. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST, supra note 19, at 47.
70. Id.
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a natural part of human thought, and linguistic metaphor is a natural
part of human language."7'
I will not go into the specifics of the neurobiology behind the cognitive
or conceptual theory of metaphor here. 72 For purposes of this discussion, I will accept the claims of Lakoff, Johnson, and Winter that
metaphorical reasoning is a deep cognitive aspect of our analytical
processes.7 8 The interesting part of this claim is the constitutive nature
of metaphor in our analytical frameworks.74 Whether metaphor is a
fundamental cognitive aspect of reasoning brought about by neurobiological, 75 social, 7 or phenomenologica77 causes--or some complex mix-

ture of them allvs -is not really necessary to the application of the
theory.79 Others have done a much better job laying out the cognitive
science80 and philosophy of mind8 behind the theory of Lakoff and
Johnson8 2 than I could possibly do. What is useful in the present
discussion, however, is that Lakoff, Johnson, and Winter appear to be
correct in noting that metaphorical reasoning seems to be a fundamental
aspect of human reasoning. In other words, the relationship between
how we analyze and use concepts and metaphorical reasoning seems to
be borne out. It does not appear that metaphor is simply a linguistic
device that is used to illustrate complex points. Something deeper is
implicated. Understanding why and how this works conceptually or
biologically may be interesting, but it is not a prerequisite to the use or
attractiveness of the theory itself.8"

71. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 247.
72. See, e.g., Eve Leeman & Susan Leeman, Elements of Dynamics IV: Neuronal
Metaphors-Probing Neurobiology for Psychodynamic Meaning, 32 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHOANALYSIS & DYNAMIC PSYCHIATRY 654 (2004).
73. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 3-9.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g,, Leeman & Leeman, supra note 72.
76. Richard H. Brown, Social Theory as Metaphor: On the Logic of Discovery for the
Sciences of Conduct, 3 THEORY & SOC'Y 169 (1976).
77. KOVECSES, supra note 17.
78. Mark Johnson & Tim Rohrer, We Are Live Creatures: Embodiment, American
Pragmatism,and the Cognitive Organism,in 1 BODY, LANGUAGE, AND MIND (Jordan Zlatev,
Tom Ziemke, Roz Frank & Rene Dirven eds., 2005).
79. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 272-73.
80. Tim Rohrer, The Cognitive Science of Metaphorfrom Philosophy to Neuroscience,
in 6 THEORIA ET HIsTORIA SCIENTARIUM 27 (2001); EARL R. MAcCORMAC, A COGNITIVE
THEORY OF METAPHOR (1987).
81. See generally LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5.
82. See Rohrer, supra note 80.
83. Thanks to my friend Jack Sammons for pointing this out so clearly.
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So what is this cognitive or conceptual theory of metaphor, and how
does it operate? Simply put, the way that human beings conceive of and
make sense of the world is driven by a conceptual system."
Our
8 5
conceptual system is a tether to reality.
In essence, we could not
make sense of the world and the things that happen in the world
without some field of reference.8" This field of reference allows us to
grapple with phenomena that we confront, and make sense of those
phenomena in a way that allows us to operate productively.7 We
experience the world in terms of our conceptual field of reference and
literally create our realities by relating phenomena to that field of
reference.88 According to proponents of the cognitive or conceptual
theory of metaphor, this conceptual system is metaphorical in nature.8 9
Advocates of the cognitive or conceptual theory of metaphor maintain
that human beings always "understand[] and experienc[e] one kind of
thing in terms of another."9" This may seem somewhat banal on its
face, but for theorists like Lakoff and Johnson, the implications are
profound. For example, we often conceptualize argumentation between
people in terms of violent conflict.91 The argument is war metaphor is
pervasive in our culture and perhaps every culture.92 We say things
like "your claims are indefensible," "he attacked every weak point in my
93
argument," and "h[er] criticisms were right on target."
According to
Lakoff and Johnson, these are not simply convenient and artful ways of
describing arguments. 4
They actually form how we think about
arguments.9" In other words, we cannot understand the act of arguing
without the relationship between arguing and war coming forth in our
minds and structuring our conceptual scheme. The terms of the latter
(war, the source concept) form our understanding of the former (arguing,
the target concept).9" Our understanding is structured according to
this pattern."

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 3.
WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST, supra note 19, at 6.
Id. at ch. 1.
Id. at chs. 1-3.
Id. at 67.
LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 3.
Id. at 5 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at ch. 1.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at ch. 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Let us look at this metaphor for a moment to see what exactly Lakoff
and Johnson mean. When we liken arguments to war we do not literally
mean that people engage in actual physical acts of war or violence when
they argue (although this has surely been known to happen)., 8 Instead,
we are employing a cognitive association between the two kinds of
activities. This association helps us make sense of the activity. For
example, we often plan our arguments by thinking in strategic ways. 99
Or we feel like we have won when our opponent has been vanquished (or
driven from the field). This existential aspect is important. When we
operate conceptually according to these deep cognitive associations, we
actually engage the target concept (arguing) in the terms of the source
concept (war).' 0 How we understand arguing, how we do it, and how
we explain it all employ the association with war.' 1
According to Lakoff and Johnson, a host of common metaphors help us
understand the world.0 2 Lakoff and Johnson have identified structural metaphors,0 °
orientational
metaphors,'
ontological metaphors,"°5 and a whole host of other common metaphorical concepts 0 6 that provide fields of reference for our understanding of the
world and our place in it.'
The common thread between these sorts
of metaphors is that all of them "have entailments through which they
highlight and make coherent certain aspects of our experience."0 8
Lakoff and Johnson go on to say that metaphors "create realities for us,
especially social realities. A metaphor may thus be a guide for future
action. Such actions will, of course, fit the metaphor. This will, in turn,
reinforce the power of the metaphor to make experience coherent." °9
In other words, the use of metaphor enables us to understand but

98. As in the recent example of the Mexican federal elections, where representatives
of the National Action Party (PAN) and the opposition Party of the Democratic Revolution
(PRD) came to blows over disputed election results. See Luis Rubio & Jeffrey Davidow,
Mexico's Disputed Election, FOREIGN AFFAms (Sept./Oct. 2006) http://www.foreign
affairs.org/2006O901faessay85507/luis-rubio-jeffrey-davidow/mexico-s-disputed-election.htm

(last visited Apr. 23, 2007).
99. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 4.

100. Id.
101.

Id.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at ch. 2.
Id. at chs. 1-3.
Id. at ch. 4.
Id. at ch. 6.
Id. at ch. 10.
See, e.g., id. at ch. 12. Others have picked up on this as well. See, e.g., supra note

17.
108. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 156.
109. Id.
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commonly will constrain that understanding as well. Often these
constraints will be based in our shared cultural meanings." ° As
Lakoff and Johnson put it, "The most fundamental values in a culture
will be coherent with the metaphorical structure of the most fundamental concepts in the culture.""' This might explain why the arguing is
war metaphor has such currency" 2 in U.S. culture." 3
Since we
understand some things in terms of other things, we are conceptually
limited in what we can understand by what we already know (in terms
of our root epistemological and cultural understanding). Our limitations
are reinscribed. We will continue to understand arguments in terms of
violent conflict because this is what we know." 4 Conceptualizing
arguments in other ways (cooperative ways, for instance) would be
difficult because the inscription and reinscription run so deep conceptually and cognitively." 5
While much more could be said about the specifics of this theory,"'
enough has been outlined for present purposes. Thus far I have
discussed how the cognitive or conceptual theory of metaphor maintains
that metaphors are fundamental to our understanding, that these
metaphors structure how we see the world, provide us with meaning and
reference, and serve as a tether to our relationship with phenomena in
the world.
Often these metaphors are based in shared cultural
understandings and have both an enabling and a limiting effect on our
understanding. These basic concepts have important implications. In
areas like law"' and politics,"' for instance, how we relate to one
another in the world is set in place by metaphors that cut deep-deep
across cultural, economic, historical, and ideological lines.

110. Id. at ch. 5.
111. Id. at 22.
112. Or why the idea as currency metaphor is as pervasive.
113. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 4.
114. Id.
115. Id. at chs. 1-3, 5.
116. Mark L. Johnson, Mind, Metaphor, Law, 58 MERCER L. REV. 845 (2007).
117. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST, supra note 19; Steven L. Winter, ReEmbodying Law, 58 MERCER L. REV. 869 (2007).
118. GEORGE LAKOFF, THINKING POINTS: COMMUNICATING OUR AMERICAN VALUES AND
VISION (2006); GEORGE LAKOFF, WHOSE FREEDOM?: THE BATTLE OVER AMERICA'S MOST
IMPORTANT IDEA (2006); GEORGE LAKOFF, HOWARD DEAN & DON HAZEN, DON'T THINK OF
AN ELEPHANT: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE-THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE FOR
PROGRESSiVES (2004); GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS : How LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK (2002).
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B.

Metaphors of Exclusion
According to proponents of the cognitive or conceptual theory of
metaphor, certain kinds of metaphors provide us with fundamental fields
of reference so that we can make sense out of new or developing
circumstances by relating them to other things we understand." 9 One
category of these fundamental fields of reference is container metaphors. 120 Container metaphors are spatial in their basic orientation.
Such spatial metaphors set out reference points for our understanding. 12 1 When we say things like "he is in love," "that statement was
out of bounds," and "we are in trouble," we are making reference to the
way we see things fitting into our conceptions of the world as a physical,
bounded place.' 22 Container metaphors make sense at one level
because we are physical creatures who conceive of ourselves as set off
from the rest of the world.'1
They are, in essence, phenomenological
in an important and fundamental way. We can take things in (sensory
data, information, among other things), and we can project things
outward to the world."' This disposition is so pervasive that we try
to impose such an orientation on practically every aspect of our interface
with the world.' 25 Our relationships ("he is in love," "we are on the
outs!"), our spaces ("move in to the apartment," "you are in my personal
space"), our conceptions of morality ("that was outside the bounds of
acceptable behavior"), and our notions of law ("in the four corners of the
document," "it was within his rights to do such a thing") are all largely
conceived of in terms of container metaphors. 2 ' Some conceptions of
knowledge are themselves container metaphors. 12' The strict sense of
formal logic also plays on the in or out orientation of this metaphoric
conception.128
One specific application of container metaphors concerns discussions
of exclusion.'29 Our political notions of who is in power or who is left

119. See supra Part II.A.
120. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 10-12, 29-32.
121. Id. at 29-32.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST, supra note 19, at 62-64.
128. Id.
129. Peace, supra note 32; Anthony Judge, Social Exclusion: A Metaphoric Trap?
Moving Beyond False Dialogue,www.laetusinpraesens.org/docs/socexc.php (last visited Apr.
23, 2007).
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out play on this set of metaphors. 3 ° In fact, much of how we relate to
others in our personal, social, political, and professional relationships
depend on this sort of spatial orientation.' 3 ' Group identity and the
granting of privilege and right depend on container metaphors. 132 It
is not too much to say that this set of metaphors actually structures the
way we see and understand such relationships." 3 In other words, this
relationship actually expresses our reality in this
metaphorical
134
context.
Political scientists and social theorists have used this relationship in
discussing the relationship of certain marginalized groups within modern
industrial societies, 5 particularly in the social context of the European Union. 3 6 Often these discussions explicitly acknowledge the work
of Lakoff and Johnson in describing how the metaphors of exclusion help
to give meaning to and constrain the dialogue concerning who is
excluded, why they are excluded, and what are the implications of such
exclusion. 137 According to these theorists, the fundamental existential
experiences of whole groups of people are literally being determined by
the metaphors that are employed when discussing the relationships the
members of these groups 13maintain in society vis-a-vis those in more
mainstream social groups. 8
Robin Peace has said that debates over the inclusion and exclusion of
individuals from certain social programs depend largely upon the
container metaphors discussed above. 139 She goes on to suggest that
these container metaphors are linked with other metaphors to create a

130. See supra note 118.
131. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 17. For an interesting application of this,
see Reginald Oh, Re-mapping Equal ProtectionJurisprudence:A Legal Geography ofRace
and Affirmative Action, 53 AM. U. L. REv. 1305 (2004).
132. Oh, supra note 131.
133. This seems to directly support Lakoff and Johnson's views.
134. Peace, supra note 32, at 24.
135. Andries Du Toit, "SocialExclusion'Discourseand ChronicPoverty:A South African
Case Study, 35 DEVELOPMENT & CHANGE 987 (2004).
136. Peace, supra note 32, at 23-24; Judge, supra note 129. One could say much about
the way these metaphors are, or can be, employed in social policy debates in the United
States. One thing is clear, however, official debates in the United States steer clear of
using the "social exclusion" title when discussing social welfare, poverty, race, class, and
gender. There are some obvious reasons for this, but discussion of this will have to wait
for another day. I use the explicit adoption of the term "social exclusion" in the European
context to illustrate the direct correlation between the policy debate and the metaphoric
terms employed in carrying out the debate.
137. Peace, supra note 32, at 24.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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complex array of representations that lock policy debates into preset
patterns." She says, for example:
The terms being used to describe social exclusion in this context entail
complex metaphorical associations. On the one hand a number of
constructs that are not, of themselves, referring to space and place
directly are inflected by language that implies downward movement.
Terms describing social exclusion are coupled with terms such as
"decline", "least", and "below". On the other hand, other constructs are
coupled with terms that invoke a sense of circularity and entrapment.
Social exclusion is inflected by association with words such as "trap",
"cycles", "web", "cumulative" and "lifecycle", all of which tend to
intensify notions of sticky complexity and inevitable negativity.""
Many of these metaphors will be familiar to us here in the United States
as well, as we have'a long history of describing our own policy debates
concerning race, class, and gender in these ways.'4 2 The interesting
thing about this use is the almost transparent way the metaphors
comprise our understanding of the concept in play.
These associations are so direct that the language of the debate itself
is defined by the metaphors used. 4' According to Peace, the policy
makers who discuss exclusion use a host of metaphors that have ceased
to be simple metaphors, but actually create the reality which these same
policy makers must address.'" These include: "being on the margins,
least-privileged groups, detachment from work relations, . . . cycles of
exclusion,.., web of disadvantages, cumulative handicaps that engender
vicious circles, situations of risk, below the poverty line, poor spaces,
poor islands, shanty towns, ghettos, clandestine residential zones, and
random residential zones ...."'145
We literally think of people out of the mainstream as being "excluded,"
"left behind," "on the fringes of society," and "on the bottom of the
barrel.""4 This association works for us whether we are discussing the
inner city neighborhoods of Chicago, the slums of Dublin, the favelas of
Rio de Janeiro, or the ghettos of Soweto. We can almost see 47 the

140. Id. at 24-29.
141. Id. at 24.
142. For an interesting discussion, see J. Mitchell Morse, Race, Class and Metaphor,
35 C. ENG. 545 (1974).
143. Peace, supra note 32, at 24.
144. Id. at 24-25.
145. Id. at 24.
146. See id.
147. For an interesting discussion about the visuality of metaphors in U.S. law, see
Hibbits, supra note 6.
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poverty when we discuss social problems in these terms.'" That is to
say, the metaphors create powerful images in our minds that make
direct 149the representations between the target and the source concepts.
This takes on an important complexion when we look at how official
For example, one
definitions of social exclusion are employed.'
European social agency has defined the concept in the following way:
Social exclusion is a set of processes, including within the labour
market and the welfare system, by which individuals, households,
communities or even whole social groups are pushed towards or kept
to the margins of society. It encompasses not only material deprivation
the denial of opportunities to participate fully in
but also more broadly
51
social and civil life.
This is a direct description of how people live in certain social circumstances, not just an artful way of describing their plight. In other words,
we actually think about poverty, social conditions, opportunity, and
material well-being in these terms. These things are, as we have just
seen, defined in these terms.'52 One would have to search long and
hard for a better, or more obvious, example of how important metaphors
are to our understanding than this. Far from being mere linguistic
realities of human
flights of fancy, these metaphoric concepts define15the
3
existence for millions of people across the globe.
But this description covers over one important aspect of this debate.
If we complacently and uncritically accept too readily the metaphors that
are common in debates surrounding social exclusion, we run the risk of
reinscribing and reifying these metaphors.TM This, in turn, makes it
impossible to change the terms of the debate.'5 5 Just as using the war
metaphor for arguing casts the latter in terms that disguise and conceal
other aspects of the social interaction (such as cooperation, among other
things), hastily accepting the terms of social exclusion can potentially
conceal more subtle aspects of the social relationships implicated and
can make the debate appear overly simplistic or mechanistic. 5 6 One
student of the social exclusion debate has said:

148. Peace, supra note 32, at 23-25.
149. LAKOFF, supra note 50, at 276-78.
150. Peace, supra note 32, at 26.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153.

LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 243-44.

154. See Judge, supra note 129, at 1.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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"Exclusion" has the obvious consequence of implying that some people
are "shut out," which is clearly totally unacceptable. However it tends
to structure thinking in terms of obvious mechanistic responses such
as how they should be "let in". Simplistic proposals invite simplistic
counter-proposals. Furthermore the metaphor sets up a mind set that
echoes the past tendencies to create fortified walled cities and
monasteries to keep unwanted people out and to protect the privileged.'67
Surely the metaphors surrounding exclusion are useful in showing how
certain people and groups are disadvantaged by social policies, class
structures, government initiatives, racism, and so on.' 58 But can these
very metaphors be counter-productive to those who find themselves in
such disadvantageous circumstances? The answer seems to be yes. 5 9
When the association between a source and target concept are so close,
If individuals
the metaphors used can become overly mechanical." 6
or groups who are disadvantaged identify too closely with the metaphors
of exclusion, an "us vs. them" dichotomy is constructed that itself
reinforces the patterns of disadvantage. 6 ' The metaphors of exclusion
"only work[] if there is agreement on a single boundary and on the
unquestionable value of what is on the inside compared to what is on the
In this way, using these metaphors can actually be
outside." 62
counterproductive because such use cuts off different ways of conceptualizing the problem of disadvantage." 6 The use of these metaphors also
explicitly pits the disadvantaged against the advantaged.' 64 This
As Anthony Judge puts
makes productive dialogue highly unlikely."
highly motivating for
therefore
be
may
it, "The 'exclusion' metaphor
those outside, but it may be totally counterproductive in motivating
those inside to respond to their condition."' 66
So what is the answer to this dilemma? If, as Lakoff and Johnson
assert, metaphors are fundamental to our understanding, how does one
counter the tendency to conflate widely accepted metaphorical constructs
with reality? In other words, how can we cut loose the tether between

157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Ayse C. Qaglar, ConstrainingMetaphors and the Transnationalisation
of Spaces in Berlin, 27 J. ETHNIc & MIGRATION STUD. 601 (2001).
159. See, e.g., Judge, supra note 129.
160. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 253.
161. Judge, supra note 129, at 2-4.
162. Id. at 2.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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war and argument, and between exclusion and disadvantage, so that
new-and perhaps more socially constructive-metaphors can be
employed? The answer to these questions lies in the cognitive theory of
metaphor itself.'67 When a single metaphorical structure is used, the
sort of simplistic or mechanical association and conflation discussed
above is likely to occur."6 But each reality contains overlapping
metaphorical structures.'6 9 Arguments are like war, but they are also
like journeys, and like buildings, containers, and so on down the
line. 7 ° We get a fuller picture of the target concept (argument), when
we understand the overlapping source concepts (war, journey, building,
container, among other things).' 7' To view arguments only in terms
of the metaphors of war is overly simplistic. A truer, and more
metaphorically rich, way of discussing arguments would account for all
the sorts of metaphors that illustrate and illuminate aspects of the
target concept.'72 Simply put, cognitive metaphor theory is not an
exercise in reduction; it is an expression of conceptual imagination and
possibility.'7'
Returning to metaphors of exclusion, then, a fuller appraisal of the
dynamics of disadvantage would acknowledge the container metaphors
associated with this structural relationship but would not reify them into
concrete categories that freeze the relationship in place.' 74 More
expansive metaphorical structures can and should be used to illustrate
and illuminate the complexity of disadvantage and social inequality.' 7'
Metaphors of exclusion show us part of the picture, a vital and
important part perhaps, but not necessarily the whole picture-maybe
not even a significant part of the entire landscape.'76 Opening up the
horizons of a concept by evaluating the various metaphorical structures
that can be brought to bear on that concept is an interpretive act of the
highest magnitude.'7 7 By doing so, we can use our cognitive tools to
imagine new ways of conceptualizing problems and addressing them.
This sort of enterprise can be useful whether the scope of disproportionate power relationships is on a societal level (as with class, ethnicity,

167.
168.
169.

LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at chs. 17-18.
Id.
Id.

170.

See, e.g., id.

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id.
Id. at Afterword, 2003 at 253.
See, e.g., Judge, supra note 129.
Id. at 4-5.
Id.
LAKoFF & JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 249-50.
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gender, and race, among other things), or on an institutional level
(within discourse communities or professional groups, for example). In
the last part of this Article, I discuss the use of exclusion metaphors
within the legal academy, an example of an institutional dialogue that
seems, in some ways, to have fallen into the trap identified above. It is
my hope that this discussion will allow us-all of us within the legal
academy-to reimagine the problem of faculty status-and the disproportionate relationship between doctrinal (or casebook) faculty and legal
skills faculty (particularly legal writing faculty).
III.

ALWAYS A BRIDESMAID AND NEVER A BRIDE? 17 s

An ever-growing body of scholarship in the legal academy makes the
case for why professors who teach legal skills (advocacy and clinics, for
example) and legal writing should be given the same benefits, pay, and
status as other members of their law school faculties. 7 ' These articles
generally do a very good job of outlining the disparities in treatment that
skills professors face in law schools across the United States.'80 One
commentator has said that "[l]egal writing isn't the stepchild of legal
education, as it's sometimes called. It isn't even the foster child. It's
more like an abused child."''
The disparities are, in fact, quite
remarkable.'8 2 Legal skills professors often have their offices segregated from casebook faculty, are given inferior academic titles (like "instruc-

178. The use of this particular metaphor is deliberate, as much of the debate
concerning the issue of status in legal education (particularly in the context of those who
teach legal writing) focuses on the genuine and important issues of gender bias. See, e.g.,
Jo Anne Durako, Dismantling Hierarchies: Occupational Segregation of Legal Writing
Faculty in Law Schools: .Separateand Unequal, 73 UMKC L. REV. 253 (2004); Elizabeth
M. Iglesias et al., Labor and Employment in the Academy-A Critical Look at the Ivory
Tower: Proceedingsofthe 2002 Annual Meeting of the Association ofAmerican Law Schools,
Joint Program of the Section on Labor Relations and Employment Law and Section on
Minority Groups, 6 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 129 (2002); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Rooms
of Their Own: An Empirical Study of Occupational Segregation by Gender Among Law
Professors, 73 UMKC L. REV. 293 (2004); Ann C. McGinley, Discriminationin Our Midst:
Law Schools' Potential Liability for Employment Practices, 14 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1
(2005); Richard K. Neumann, Women in Legal Education:A Statistical Update, 73 UMKC
L. REV. 419 (2004); Kathryn M. Stanchi, Who Next, the Janitors?A Socio-FeministCritique
of the Status Hierarchyof Law Professors, 73 UMKC L. REV. 467 (2004).
179. See, e.g., supra note 178.
180. Id.; see also Duncan Kennedy, Introduction to Symposium on Dismantling
Hierarchiesin Legal Education, 73 UMKC L. REV. 231 (2004).
181. Bryan Garner, Legal Writing: How Serious is Your School About Writing?,
STUDENT LAw., Oct. 2000, at 16, 18.
182. Susan P. Liemer & Jan M. Levine, Legal Research and Writing: What Schools are
Doing and Who is Doing the Teaching (Three Years Later), 9 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING
113 (2003-2004).
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tor"), are unable to participate in faculty governance, and have
"circumscribed academic freedom, separate and unequal pay scales,
and
other indicia of second-class status."'" It is also no secret that the
vast majority of legal skills professors are not in tenured or tenureearning positions on the faculty."
This body of scholarship has
contributed to the growth and professionalization of the field of legal
writing, certainly.'85 As one scholar puts it, the value of this scholarship "heightens the prestige of the legal writing faculty, not only among
our colleagues, but among our students, who will be less likely to view
us as second-class citizens." 8 6
One frequent theme of such scholarship has been the use of metaphors
of exclusion.8 7 One scholar, for example, has said that the relationship between casebook and skills professors in law schools is akin to the
segregation between blacks and whites in the United States. 8 ' A wellknown law school dean equated this relationship with the Hindu caste
system in India,5 9 where casebook professors fill the ranks of the
upper-caste Brahmins while skills professors reside in the second lowest
caste."9 Another well-known legal writing scholar has said that there
are "commonalities between the treatment of legal writing [in the legal
academy] and the type of social stratification that exists elsewhere in
society."' 9 ' Finally, the status of legal skills professors has been called

183. Durako, supra note 178, at 255.
184. See Association of Legal Writing Directors ("ALWD") 2006 Survey, at i, available
at http://www.alwd.orgalwdResources/surveys/2006%20survey%20results%20report%20
(final).pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2007).
185. Emily Grant, Toward a Deeper Understandingof Legal Research and Writing as
a Developing Profession, 27 VT. L. REV. 371 (2003); Ellie Margolis & Susan L. DeJarnatt,
Moving Beyond Product to Process:Building a Better LRW Program, 46 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 93 (2005); Terrill Pollman, Building a Tower of Babel or Building a Discipline?
Talking About Legal Writing, 85 MARQ. L. REv. 887 (2002); David S. Romantz, The Truth
About Cats and Dogs: Legal Writing Courses and the Law School Curriculum, 52 U. KAN.
L. REV. 105 (2003). For an interesting student viewpoint on this see, Melissa A. Moodie
& Brette S. Hart, The Missing Link: The Need for Good Writing Programsin Law Schools,
74 J. KAN. B. Ass'n 9 (2005).
186. Michell Nathanson, Taking the Road Less Traveled: Why PracticalScholarship
Makes Sense for the Legal Writing Professor, 11 LEGAL WRITING 329, 331 (2005); see also
Toni M. Fine, Legal Writers Writing: Scholarship and the Demarginalizationof Legal
Writing Instructors, 5 LEGAL WRITING 225, 227-28 (1999).
187. See supra note 129.
188. Durako, supra note 178, at 253-56.
189. Kent D. Syverud, The Caste System and Best Practicesin Legal Education, 1 J.
Ass'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 12 (2001).
190. Id. at 14-15.
191. Stanchi, supra note 178, at 469.
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a "pink ghetto."'92 These metaphors have illustrated the stark realities of the relationship largely non-tenured 93 (mostly women)"
skills professors maintain with their tenured (mostly male) 95 casebook ' colleagues on the faculty. As Kathy Stanchi has put it, "The
legal writing profession is a place where the complexities of institutionalized inequality, economics and gender bias intersect."'97 A whole host
of metaphors of exclusion have been used to make this case.19
In the years since this scholarship started appearing with some
regularity in law journals and law reviews, the benefits, pay, and status
of legal writing professors have increased in many places.' There are
now more people in tenure-track legal writing positions than ever
before," ° and the compensation schemes of many legal writing professors have improved dramatically in recent years.2"' Given this information, it seems that the advocacy some have maintained on behalf of
those who teach legal writing has borne fiuit. ° 2 There are some signs,
however, that deans and faculty members at many institutions are
resistant to continuing progress. 2 3 In fact, notwithstanding the
advances just mentioned, there is a widespread perception that much,
much more needs to be done.2 °4 So why has the political advocacy not

192. Jo Anne Durako, Second-Class Citizens in the Pink Ghetto: Gender Bias in Legal
Writing, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 562 (2000); Susan Ayres, Pink Ghetto, 11 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 1, 2 (1999).
193. See ALWD 2006 Survey, supra note 184.
194. Stanchi, supra note 178, at 467.
195. Id.
196. I adopt the term "casebook professors" here, coined by Mary Beth Beazley, because
like Professor Beazley I reject the notion that those who teach casebook courses are
teaching doctrine or substance, while skills professors teach technical skills. Both casebook
and skills faculty members are teaching doctrine and substance. The pedagogical
approaches may vary, but the aim is the same. See Mary Beth Beazley, Better Writing,
Better Thinking: Using Legal Writing Pedagogy in the "Casebook" Classroom (Without
Grading Papers), 10 LEGAL WRITING 23, 25 n.13 (2004).
197. Stanchi, supra note 178, at 469.
198. Durako, supra note 178, at 254.
199. There was a significant positive shift in salary, teaching loads, and contract status
from 1999 to 2006. See ALWD 2006 Survey, supra note 184, at 6.
200. See id.
201. See supra note 178.
202. SOURCEBOOK ON LEGAL WRITING PROGRAMS xiii (2d ed. 2006).
203. The American Law Dean's Association (ALDA) has long opposed requirements by
the American Bar Association (ABA)-the accrediting body for all law schools in the United
States-that would increase the status of those who teach legal skills courses. See Posting
of Craig Smith, craig.smith@law.vanderbilt.edu, to dircon@lists.washlaw.edu (Jan. 17,
2007) (on file with author).
204. See, e.g., Mary S. Lawrence, The Legal Writing Institute the Beginning:
ExtraordinaryVision, ExtraordinaryAccomplishment, 11 LEGAL WRITING 213 (2005).
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worked? Is it simply a matter that those in power (tenured, male) refuse
to share their privilege with those they believe are beneath them
(untenured, mostly female)?. 5 Is there an "institutionalized status
system" that "reflects a rigid and empty adherence to a set of artificial
and contrived rules of prestige and rank that are unjustifiable and
enforced by power and dominance rather than reason"?20 1 At one
obvious level, this is surely part of the answer.2 " The legal academy
is certainly one bastion of power and privilege, 0 8 and change comes
hard to such institutions.0 9 In my view, though, something else is at
work.
The metaphors of exclusion have become so pervasive in the debate
between casebook and skills faculty that I worry the categories have
become too concrete. By making the case for why people who teach legal
skills courses are currently treated unfairly, and explaining how this
injustice should be remedied, an interesting thing has happened. The
rhetoric used to explain the exclusion of skills faculty members from the
mainstream of the legal academy ("hierarchy," "locked out," "left behind,"
"segregation," "ghetto," among others) has come to be so closely
associated with the relationship between individuals who teach casebook
courses and those who teach skills courses at most U.S. law schools that
this rhetoric (and the metaphors used) inscribes (and reinscribes) the
very nature of the relationship. 2 0 By showing how casebook faculty
have treated skills faculty as outsiders, the exclusionary status has come
to define how skills faculty see themselves. As Duncan Kennedy has

205. See generally Marina Angel, The Glass Ceiling for Women in Legal Education:
Contract Positions and the Death of Tenure, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (2000); Marina Angel,
Women in Legal Education:What It's Like to be Partof a PerpetualFirst Wave or the Case
of the DisappearingWomen, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 799 (1988); Maureen J. Arrigo, Hierarchy
Maintained:Status and GenderIssues in Legal Writing Programs,70 TEMPLE L. REV. 117
(1997); Nancy Levit, Keeping Feminism in Its Place:Sex Segregation and the Domestication
of FemaleAcademics, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 775 (2001); Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F.
Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials:The Truth About Affirmative Action in Law Faculty
Hiring, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 199 (1997); Richard K. Neumann, Women in Legal Education:
What the Statistics Show, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313 (2000); Kathryn M. Stanchi & Jan M.
Levine, Genderand Legal Writing:Law Schools'DirtyLittle Secrets, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 1 (2001); Kathryn M. Stanchi & Jan M. Levine, Women, Writing & Wages: Breaking
the Last Taboo, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 551 (2001).
206. Stanchi, supra note 178, at 468.
207. See id.
208. Id.; Lisa Eichhorn, Writing in the Legal Academy: A Dangerous Supplement? 40
ARIZ. L. REV. 105, 139 (1998).
209. Eichhorn, supra note 208, at 139.
210. There are ways to combat this, of course. See Suzanne E. Rowe & Susan P.
Liemer, One Small Step: Beginning the Processof InstitutionalChange to Integrate the Law
School Curriculum, 1 J. ASSN LEGAL WRrING DIRECTORS 218 (2002).
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said, "The categories are self-perpetuating: working in one of the
categories disables you from working in the other, and, just as important, most likely makes you prefer working in your category."2 11 The
"us vs. them" dialogic has become reified to the point that skills faculties
actually do see themselves as different: different in pedagogy, different
in teaching loads, different in focus (teaching vs. scholarship), and so on.
This, in turn, has the strange effect of seeming to legitimize the claims
of casebook faculty members that skills "instructors" are different.212
Just as the terms of the social exclusion debate in Europe have become
concretized-making progress on poverty, education, welfare, and so on
difficult-the terms of exclusion (flowing from the exclusion and
container metaphors) used by skills faculty members have locked in
place the dichotomous relationship between themselves and casebook
teachers. And thus, the cycle continues. I am not suggesting that the
metaphors of exclusion used in this context (or any other for that matter)
are illegitimate. The criticisms aimed at the legal academy by skills
professors who have diminished status are well-deserved in my opinion.
I am only questioning whether the continued adherence to these
metaphors is as effective as many might assume. I am asking whether
we might find a better way out of the current predicament.
In my view, there should be no difference at all between skills and
casebook faculty. The dichotomy makes no sense, from either perspective. I do not want my colleagues who teach administrative law,
contracts, secured transactions, international law, tax, and trusts and
estates to treat me differently because I teach skills courses, of course,
but neither would I ever act as though I am different (vis-a-vis the basic
expectations of the profession). Luckily, I teach at an institution with
a faculty who treats me (and others who teach skills classes) in the same
way any other faculty member is treated. I, naturally, believe that such
treatment is warranted, especially since I and my colleagues on the
faculty who teach skills do not act differently. We are held to, and meet,
the same expectations as anyone else on the faculty with regard to
teaching, scholarship, and service. I am not naive, however. I know
that at many institutions, people who teach skills courses do not have
this luxury. I am merely suggesting that the dynamic goes both ways.
If we want to get out of the ghetto, break the segregation, subvert the
hierarchy, become part of the club, and so on, we need to focus on what
we do and how we do it. We can neither reinscribe these categories of

211. Kennedy, supra note 180, at 234.
212. One extremely uninformed and terse discussion in this context is Stewart Harris,
Giving Up GrammarandDumping Derrida:How to Make Legal Writing a Respected Part
of the Law School Curriculum, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 291 (2004).
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exclusion with our own actions, nor with calls for "different" treatment
because our classes place certain demands on us.
This reinscription can be illustrated most clearly in terms of the
discussion surrounding the production of scholarship by skills professors.21 Over the years, casebook faculty members have maintained
" of
that skills professors do not produce the quantity or the quality 14
scholarship that would warrant their being considered fully-fledged
members of the legal academy.21 As a result, skills professors have
been severely disadvantaged by the members of the academy in terms
of status and compensation.1 6 This is assuredly a wretched consequence, even if there is some logic (albeit somewhat twisted and quite
probably sinister) to it.
The mere fact is, however, that the legal academy (like other
academies in modern education) places an extremely high value on the
production of scholarship by its members.2 17 Faculty members at
almost every law school in the United States218 are required to produce
some sort of scholarship in order to meet the basic obligations of their
position and the expectations of others within the profession.2 19 Many
rationales have been offered to justify such a requirement, including:

213. See, e.g., James M. Boland, Legal Writing Programs and Professionalism:Legal
Writing Professors Can Join the Academic Club, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 711 (2006);
Eichhorn, supra note 208.
214. The quality of legal scholarship generally is a very controversial issue. One good
discussion of evaluating legal scholarship can be found in Edward L. Rubin, The Practice
and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835 (1988). Traditional legal
scholarship tends to focus on "abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship."
Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1993). Because legal skills professionals tend to write
more practically oriented articles and books, they are at a disadvantage in this system.
For a good article that discusses a shift in this focus, written by two professors who have
both practiced law for significant periods and have taught both legal skills and casebook
courses, see David Hricik & Victoria S. Salzmann, Why there Should be FewerArticles Like
this One: Law Professors Should Write More for Legal Decision-Makers and Less for
Themselves, 38 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 761 (2005). Such a shift would lead to significant
advantages for those who teach and write about practical legal issues. Id. at 779.
215. See generally Harris, supra note 212.
216. See supra note 199.
217. See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Ranking and Explainingthe
Scholarly Impact of Law Schools, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (1998).
218. There is at least one law school that I know of personally that essentially has no

such requirement. The name of that law school, however, has been omitted to protect the
innocent.
219. Philip F. Postlewaite, Publish or Perish:The Paradox,50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157,
158-59 (2000).
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advancing the knowledge of humanity;22 0 enhancing teaching effectiveness;221 affecting the work of others in the profession; 222 and serving
as a vehicle for personal and professional growth and transformation.223 Whatever the reason (or, most likely, combination of reasons),
the requirement of producing scholarship is-at most law schools-at
least as important as teaching (and in some schools, perhaps more
important). 224 As a result, anyone wishing to be taken seriously as a
member of 22the
legal academy in the United States needs to act
5
accordingly.
Those of us who teach legal skills courses are no exception to this.226
As Lisa Eichhorn put it, "iT]hose who teach [legal] writing should use
scholarship as a means both to inform the academy of the substance of
legal writing as a discipline and to increase their own status within that
academy."221 She notes, correctly in my view, that doing scholarship
can break the pattern of division between casebook and legal skills
professors, thus allowing a new relationship to emerge from old
hierarchies.2 28 More recently, legal writing teachers Suzanne Rowe
and Sue Liemer, both respected scholars within the ranks of the legal
academy and who teach legal writing, have said that skills professors
need to "act like ducks" in this context in order to be accepted by their
casebook colleagues. 22' The idea here is that legal skills professors
must do all the things that any other member of a law faculty would do
in order to be accepted. 2 0 This is especially true of the production of
scholarship given the important role that producing scholarship plays in

220. Linda H. Edwards & Terrill Pollman, Scholarship by Legal Writing Professors:
New Voices in the Legal Academy, 11 LEGAL WRITING 3, 15 (2005); see also Stephen L.
Carter, Academic Tenure and 'White Male" Standards:Some Lessons from the PatentLaw,
100 YALE L.J. 2065, 2080 (1991); Banks McDowell, The Audiences for Legal Scholarship,
40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 261, 270 (1990).
221. Edwards & Pollman, supra note 220, at 15-16; see also Ronald Benton Brown, A
Cure for Scholarship Schizophrenia:A Manifesto for Sane Productivity and Productive
Sanity, 13 NOVA L. REV. 39, 49-51 (1988); Clark Byse, Legal Scholarship,Legal Realism
and the Law Teacher's Intellectual Schizophrenia, 13 NoVA L. REV. 9, 29-30 (1988).
222. Edwards & Poilman, supra note 220, at 16; see also Edward L. Rubin, The Practice
and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1847-48 (1988).
223. Edwards & Pollman, supra note 220, at 17; see also James Boyd White, Why I
Write, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1021, 1031-32 (1996).
224. Postlewaite, supra note 218, at 157-59.
225. Id.
226. Eichhorn, supra note 208, at 140.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 140-41.
229. Rowe & Liemer, supra note 210, at 224-25.
230. Id.
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defining the academy.23 ' Acting "like a duck" and producing scholarship is "invaluable in breaking into the hierarchy of the legal academy." 23 2
Linda Edwards and Terri Pollman (also well-recognized
scholars who happen to teach legal skills courses) recently noted that the
production of scholarship seems like a vital aspect of professional
expectations of legal skills professors. 233 They have said that "if
writing is important for the development of faculty members who teach
subjects other than writing, it is doubly important for the development
of those whose primary teaching area is the writing process itself."2aI
It is certainly clear that many legal skills professors have learned this
lesson. 235 All across the United States, legal skills professionals-no
matter what status they are accorded at their particular institution-are
producing and publishing scholarly works in a variety of fields, not just
legal writing and clinical or practical skills.2 3 6 There seems to be some
correlation, as I suggested earlier, between the arrival of this body of
scholarship on the scene and the upward shift in status (albeit slow) that
many legal skills professionals have enjoyed. 2 7 Legal skills faculty
members have started to "find their own voices.
These voices are
heard 23 9 in all the halls of the legal academy, in all aspects of the
doctrinal debates of law and legal theory, and throughout the legal
profession.2 4 °
This sounds like a success story. It is, in fact, in many ways
testament to the work and determination of people who have faced
significant and sustained barriers to their inclusion in to the legal
academy. Many of the people who have produced this impressive body
of scholarship have done so with little or no support from their
institutions.2 4' Some who teach legal skills courses, however, have not
joined this movement. Many decry the high workloads of their classes
and the demands of skills pedagogy.2412 These workloads and demands

231. Eichhorn, supra note 208, at 141.
232. Boland, supra note 213, at 734.
233. Edwards & Pollman, supra note 220, at 5.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Rowe & Liemer, supra note 210, at 225.
238. Edwards & Poliman, supra note 220, at 57.
239. For an interesting discussion of the relationship between the verbal and the
written see Eichhorn, supra note 208; see also Grant, supra note 185, at 382-84.
240. See Edwards & Pollman, supra note 220.
241. Id. at 5.
242. See Boland, supra note 213, at 734; Eichhorn, supra note 208, at 140; Grant, supra
note 185, at 391-92; Pollman, supra note 185, at 925-26.
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are surely an issue. But it is almost as if some within the legal skills
community identify so closely with the status divisions set in place by
those in power in the traditional hierarchy (casebooks professors who
produce scholarship vs. skills professors who do not produce scholarship)
that they resist the move to be like the other. There is clearly some
resistance within the legal skills community to do this vital part of what
it will take to join the ranks of the legal academy. I suspect that this
resistance is based, at least in part, on taking the metaphors of exclusion
so seriously that the metaphors ("left out," "shut out," "disadvantaged,"
"ghettoized," among others) define reality. Because these metaphors
have become reified, some in the legal skills community think "why
bother?" I have been told by an alarming number of people who teach,
or have taught, legal skills courses that "since we'll never be part of the
club, why should I act like I want to be in the club?"
This seems like a classic case in which the metaphors of exclusion
have been taken to heart so deeply that no other way of discussing the
relationship between various parts of the legal academy seems possible.
However, new ways of characterizing the relationship between casebook
and skills faculties are possible. New alliances can be formed. We need
to imagine the possible. We need to construct new metaphors that will
change the dynamic within the legal academy. I am not entirely certain
what these metaphors should be, but I am sure that they should
highlight the common enterprise of preparing students for dynamic legal
practice in an evolving marketplace, an enterprise
that casebook and
2
non-casebook professors are committed to. 4
There is, however, a ticket for admission. Professors who teach legal
skills classes, some of whom desperately want the title "Professor" to be
part of their increased status, should remember that in all parts of the
academy-not just the legal academy-scholarship is an important part
of the job. Complaining that we are "left out" or "ghettoized," or that
"we get no scholarship support" and "our teaching loads are so high,"
does not substitute for the price of admission. The positions supported
by these metaphors of exclusion that dominate legal skills scholarship
are overly simplistic, mechanistic responses to the hierarchy presently
in place. These metaphors may be true; they may even be accurate
descriptions of the situation, but they are not the only reality. We can
create alternative realities that are better captured by other metaphors,
metaphors that overlap to show a fuller picture of the academy and what
we hope it to be. Exclusionary metaphors are part of that picture, but

243. This is a project that all members of the legal education community need to
engage in. Constructing new metaphors is not an easy thing, but doing so can yield
tremendous results for the entire legal academy.
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I hope they are a diminishing part. Other metaphors can open up
different avenues for discourse, 2 " and can readjust the hierarchies
within the legal academy.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Metaphors are powerful things. As the cognitive or conceptual theory
of metaphor developed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson shows,
metaphors have substantial real world and existential consequences.
Metaphors are not simply literary devices that capture ideas with
interesting or pithy language. Metaphors really do affect the way we
live and understand. When people are disadvantaged, for example,
metaphors of exclusion help to capture that disadvantage and illustrate
the effects of the disparate power dynamics. But there is a danger in
using metaphors of exclusion in this way. Such metaphors can
concretize the dynamics between the advantaged and the disadvantaged
in a way that dichotomizes complex interactions. These metaphors can
also cover over other possible ways of describing and constructing the
dynamics between the advantaged and the disadvantaged. This is
especially the case when the disadvantaged themselves identify so
closely with the metaphors of exclusion that they cannot see any other
way of dealing with those who hold the advantage except in the terms
of the exclusionary metaphors. Such a situation creates a self-perpetuating cycle.
This is exactly the case, in my view, in the context of the disparity
between casebook and skills faculty members in U.S. law schools. While
the metaphors of exclusion initially helped bring to light and capture an
admittedly unjust and reprehensible state of affairs in the U.S. legal
academy, they have since become reified into categories that perpetuate
and reinscribe the dynamic of disadvantage for those who teach skills
related courses. Far from blaming the victim, I am suggesting that if we
change the nature of the metaphors that illustrate and capture the
relationship between casebook and skills faculty members, we may well
be able to change the dynamic itself. This will require people who teach
skills courses to take responsibility for their work (particularly their
scholarship) in ways that will take away easy and convenient criticisms,
criticisms that allow law school administrators and casebook faculty
members to treat us differently. If we want to be treated the same, then
we need to act like we want to be treated as fully-fledged members of the
academy and produce in ways that show we deserve it. Part of this
production should be a long term concerted project on our part to create

244.

LAKOFF, supra note 50, at 405-15.
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new metaphors that better capture our contributions to legal education,
and to modern legal practice in the United States.

